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ENFORCING THE RIGHT TO AN
"APPROPRIATE" EDUCATION:
THE EDUCATION FOR ALL HANDICAPPED
CHILDREN ACT OF 1975
Congress passed the Education for All Handicapped Children
Act of 197:; 1 in response to the need for increased funding brought
about by the widespread recognition by courts and state legislatures of the right of handicapped children to an adequate education.2 Although the Act sets forth general requirements states
must meet in order to qualify for receipt of federal funds, it does
not prescribe the specific educational programs local schools must
make available in order to fulfill those requirements. Instead, the
heart of the federal control mechanism is a system of procedural
.safeguards which provides for parental involvement in educational
placement decisions. In effect, the Act guarantees procedures
whereby parents 3 may challenge the appropriateness of their
child's educational program, but provides only the most general
guidelines for resolving the substantive questions such challenges
may present.
Since the major substantive provisions of the Act have only
recently gone into effect,4 judicial interpretation has yet to clarify
those guidelines. The basic purpose of this Note is to suggest some
pathways through the substantially unexplored terrain of the Act
and to indicate where the chief obstacles are likely to lie. Part I
first discusses the forces which led to congressional action. It then
sets forth the Act's major substantive requirements and outlines
the procedural system through which complaints will proceed.
Part II evaluates the Act's procedural system and suggests measures for improving its effectiveness as a means of enforcing the
right to an appropriate education. Finally, Part III discusses
several substantive areas in which complaints seem Hkely to
arise. This Part attempts to illuminate major areas of potential
conflict and to suggest factors decisionmakers 5 should consider
in resolving disagreements between parents and schools.
1

Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461
(1976)).
2
S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., lSt Sess. 6, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE
CoNG. & AD. NEWS 1425, 1430. The Senate committee referred to judicial action
in 27 states. Id.
3
The language of the statute does not specifically limit the right of complaint
to parents. 20 U.S.C. § l415(b)(1)(E) (1976). See Krass, The Right to Public
Education for Handicapped Children: A Primer for the New Advocate, 1976 U.
ILL. L.F. lOl6, I068.
4
See p. uo5 infra.
5
The term "decisionmakers" will be used throughout this Note to mean both
judges and state or local hearing officers.
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This Note is not intended to be an evaluation of the educational policy decisions Congress made in passing the Act. 0 Neither
does it include detailed consideration of the many alternative
sources of rights and duties in the area of education for the handicapped.7 Finally, questions relating to the Act's funding provisions - treated extensively in other articles 8 - will be noted
here only briefly.
I.

THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

The Act's legislative history clearly discloses the influence of
a number of "right to education" cases on the legislative process.0
Although the Supreme Court was never presented with the merits
of the due process and equal protection issues raised in these
cases,1° lower federal courts established several bases for a constitutional right to education for handicapped children.11 The
6
Other articles have dealt at greater length with the advantages and disadvantages of various policies incorporated in the Act. See, e.g., Haggerty &
Sacks, Education of the Handicapped: Towards a Definition of an Appropriate
Education, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 961, 988-93 (1977); Levinson, The Right to a Mi11i111ally
Adequate Education for Learning Disabled Children, 12 VAL. U.L. REV. 253, 27681 ·(1978).
7
For a discussion of the constitutional theories, see Handel, The Role of the
Advocate in Securing the Handicapped Child's Right to an Effective Mi11i111al
Education, 36 Omo ST. L.J. 349, 358-67 (1975); Krass, supra note 3, at 1026-42;
Levinson, supra note 6, at 259-67. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976), provides another avenue for litigation. See, e.g., Levinson,
supra note 6, at 281-84. Cases establishing a "right to treatment" for the involuntarily confined may also form a basis for a handicapped child's complaint. Sec,
e.g., Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 12u, 1274 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) ; McClung,
"Do Handicapped Children Have a Legal Right to a Minimally Adequate Education?", 3 J.L. & EDUC. 153, 162-66 (1974). Various state law grounds may also
exist. See id. at 166-72.
8
See Note, The Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 10 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. IIO, 120-27 (1976).
9
S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CoNG.
& AD. NEWS 1425, 1430. See, e.g., Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866
(D.D.C. 1972); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334
F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), modified, 343 F. Supp. 279 (1972). For discussions
of these and other "right to education" cases preceding the Act, see Haggerty &
Sacks, supra note 6, at 964~4; Handel, supra note 7, at 356-58; Herr, The Children Who Wait, in THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW 252, 255-64
(1976); Krass, supra note 3, at 1026-61; McClung, supra note 7, at 153-61; Note,
supra note 8, at II3 n.20.
10
See Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 731 n.102
(1978).
11
See, e.g., Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D.
Pa. 1971), modified, 343 F. Supp. 279 (1972). More recent cases have continued
the trend. See, e.g., Kruse v. Campbell, 431 F. Supp. 180 (E.D. Va. 1977), vacated
and remanded, 434 U.S. 808 (1977).
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scope of rights established through constitutional litigation was
limited by the nature of the due process and equal protection
doctrines relied upon by the courts. Due process cases established
a right to procedural protection - notice and a hearing - before
a child could be excluded from school or stigmatized by a label
such as "handicapped" or "retarded." 12 Other cases relied on
equal protection theories to forbid outright exclusion of handicapped children from the educational benefits made available to
others.13 But while constitutional litigation provided an effective
weapon for attacking gross inequities such as total exclusion,
constitutional theories gave courts little guidance in fashioning
remedies designed to serve the needs of individual children.14
In passing the Act, Congress codified and expanded the
broadest procedural rights accorded handicapped children in the
earlier cases. 15 In addition, Congress authorized large annual
appropriations to aid the states in providing expensive new services for the handicapped.16 Finally, the Act gave courts and
administrative hearing officers broad authority to prescribe the
details of educational policy i:in individual cases.17 However, its
broad substantive guidelines did not entirely overcome the difficulty encountered by courts in constitutional litigation in fashioning remedies for individual children.
Since forty-nine states have elected to participate through
receipt of federal funds,1 8 the Act and the regulations issued under
its authority 19 provide a federal statutory description of a handicapped child's right to an education. The Act requires states to
provi:ide a "free appropriate public education" to all handicapped
children between the ages of three and eighteen by September l,
1978, and to all between three and twenty-one by September l,
1980.20 Included within the definition of handicapped children
12
See Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp.
279, 295 (E.D. Pa. r972).
13
Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 875 (D.D.C. 1972); see Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 297 (E.D.
Pa. r972).
14
See Note, supra note 8, at r30.
15
Compare Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 880-81 (D.D.C. 1972),
and Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279,
303-05 (E.D. Pa. r972), with 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1976). See also Stafford, Education for the Handicapped: A Senator's Perspective, 3 VT. L. REv. 7r, 75-76 (1978);
Note, supra note 8, at n6-r7.
16
A Senate committee estimated that, on average, a handicapped child is
twice as e.'l:pensive to educate as a nonhandicapped child. S. REP. No. r68, 94th
Cong., lSt Sess. 15, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1425, 1439.
17
See p. no8 & note 37 infra.
18
New Mexico is the exception. Levinson, supra note 6, at 277.
19
45 C.F.R. § l2Ia.i-.754 (r977).
20
20 U.S.C. § 14r2(2) (B) (1976). The Act provides a limited exception for
children ages three to five and eighteen to twenty-one in some states. Id.
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are the mentally retarded, learning disabled, physically handicapped, and emotionally disturbed. 21
Eschewing any attempt at prescribing specific educational programs, the Act defines appropriate education as "special education and related services which . . . are provided in conformity
with [an] individualized education program." 22 An individualized
education program (IEP) is a "written statement for each handicapped child" developed at a meeting among the child's parents,
teacher, and a qualified school representative. 23 The statement
must describe the child's present level of performance, the objectives of the special education program, the specific services which
will make up that program, and "appropriate objective criteria"
for determining whether program objectives are being achieved. 24
Exhibiting great faith in the IEP conference to arrive at an acceptable result, the Act contains no specific guidelines for determining the substantive content of an appropriate program. To
direct placement decisions, it does include the requirement that
handicapped children should be educated together with the nonhandicapped "to the maximum extent appropriate." 25 To reduce
misclassification of children, the Act prohibits racially or culturally
biased tests and forbids reliance on any single criterion - such
as an IQ test- in determining a child's placement.20
In order to secure the rights of handicapped children, the Act
establishes detailed procedural safeguards. It grants parents the
right to present a complaint with regard to "any matter relating to
the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the
child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to
such child." 27 Parents are entitled to an "impartial due process
hearing" before a hearing examiner who is not an employee of the
agency involved in the education of the child.28 If such a hearing
initially takes place at the local level,29 an aggrieved party may
appeal to the state agency for review of the local decision. 30
21

Id. § 1401(1).
Id. § 1401 (18).
23
Id. § 14or(19).
2• Id.
25
Id. § 1412 (5)(B).
26
Id. § 1412(5){C).
27
Id. § 1415 (b)(1) (E).
28
Id. § 1415(b)(2).
29 Although most states have established procedures whereby an initial hearing
takes place at the local level and is followed, where necessary, by an appeal to a
state hearing officer, the Act does not require the two-tiered system. Id. Massachusetts provides for only a single hearing at the state level. MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 71b1 § 3 (West Supp. 1979).
30
20 U.S.C. § 1415(c) (1976). In hearings at both the state and local levels,
the Act gives parties the right to counsel, the right to present evidence and cross22
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The Act does not specify whether a state appeals examiner is
to make an entirely independent determination or is to rely on the
decision of the local hearing examiner if supported by substantial
evidence in the record. An independent state-level determination
would provide an important assurance of impartiality, given
the possible influence of parochial politics and bias on the local hearing officer.31 Moreover, since Congress gave state educational agencies the ultimate responsibility for overseeing local
compliance,32 a close check on local hearings would serve as
an effective tool of state regulation. Although a rehearing at the
state level may add to the effort and expense of the parties, they
could reduce this burden in appropriate cases by agreeing to rely
on the record of the original hearing. On balance, these considerations favor a de novo determination by the appeals examiner.
Where the administrative review procedures fail to resolve
conflicts, the Act provides that any party aggrieved by a state
determination may bring a civil action in a state or federal court.33
examine witnesses, the right to a record of the proceedings, and the right to
written findings of fact and decisions. Id. § 1415•( d).
31
See Stafford, supra note 15, at 78.
32
20 U.S.C. § 1412(6) (1976). See als<> Stafford, supra note 15, at 78.
33
20 U.S.C. § l415(e) (1976). The Act also includes a "stay put" requirement
that allows the child to remain in her current placement pending the outcome of
all administrative and judicial proceedings. Id. § l415(e)(3). A child applying for initial admission to public school is entitled to be placed in the regular
school pro;?;ram unless the parents and scliool agree to do otherwise. Id.
At least one court has enforced the "stay put" requirement without requiring
the plaintiff to exhaust her administrative remedies. In Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F.
Supp. 1235 (D. Conn. 1978), the district court enjoined the expulsion of a handicapped child and held that the Act's procedure for reevaluation - an IEP conference - provided the sole means for changing the placement of a handicapped
child. Id. at 1243. While the court left open the possibility of temporary suspension of a handicapped student in an emergency, id. at 1242, the Nappi approach
raises several potential difficulties.
First, children who have not previously been identified as handicapped may
attempt to claim the Act's protection to avoid expulsion. If courts disallow such
claims, some children who are in fact handicapped may be denied the full benefit
of the Act simply because their change of placement has been labeled "disciplinary." On the other hand, a preliminary hearing by the court to separate valid
from invalid claims would thwart the administrative hearing process specified in
the Act.
Also, the procedural protections accorded handicapped cliildren under the Act
may create disparities in the disciplinary treatment of students who have engaged
in similar conduct. Compare Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F. Supp. 1235 (D. Conn.
1978) (procedure for clianging placement of handicapped child following disruptive incident), with Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (procedure for suspension
of nonhandicapped student), and Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d
150, 158-59 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961) (procedure for expulsion
of nonhandicapped student). The perception of this disparity by other students
could undermine the credibility of school disciplinary policies.
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The court, in addition to receiving the record of the administrative
hearings, is required to hear additional evidence at the request of
any party, and to render a decision based on the preponderance of
the evidence.34 This suggests that the role of the court is to make
an independent determination and not simply to accept the findings of a hearing officer when supported by substantial evidence.31;
Of course, this requirement does not prevent the court from considering the opinions of state and local hearing officers - particularly where they agree - as an important element of the
evidence in the case.36 Finally, in fashioning remedies, the court
is empowered to order "such relief as [it] determines is appropriate." 37

II.

THE PROCEDURAL APPROACH TO ENFORCEMENT

The actual services received by an individual child are not
specifically prescribed by the Act, but result instead from a consensus arrived at during the IEP conference, or from a decision
reached by a judge or hearing officer. Congress adopted this approach for several reasons, the most obvious of which is the immense variety of special needs presented by children with different handicaps. A deaf child has special needs quite unlike
those of a mentally retarded child. Even the single label "mentally retarded" encompasses a broad spectrum of widely divergent
needs. 38 A system of regulations that prescribed a specific program for each type of handicap would inevitably ignore important
34

20 U.S.C. § r4r5 (e)(2) (r976).
See Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. I2II, r227 (E.D.N.Y. 1978)
(court provides a "de novo" hearing). The legislative history supports this interpretation. The original House version of the bill - making findings of fact by
the state agency conclusive if supported by substantial evidence - was rejected
by the conference committee and the present language was substituted. S. REP.
No. 455, 94th Cong., rst Sess. 47-50 (r975), reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE
CONG. & Ao. NEWS r480, r500-02.
36
See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 496 (1951), A court's
approach is likely to vary depending on the issue in the case. In a case requiring
the inference of racial discrimination from statistical data- a procedure familiar
to many courts, see, e.g., Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. r2u (E.D.N.Y.
1978) -few judges would defer to the decision of a hearing officer. On the other
hand, in making factual determinations requiring a more specialized knowledge,
courts may feel less inclined to substitute their judgment for the conclusions of a
specially-trained hearing examiner. See Ba2elon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHL L. REV. 742, 744 (r969).
37
20 U.S.C. § r4r5(e)(2) (r976). The authority of hearing officers is never
defined in the Act. Presumably, either a judge or hearing officer could order implementation of whatever program she deemed appropriate.
38 See Sorgen, The Classification Process and Its Consequences, in Tm: MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAw 2r5, 2r6 (1976).
35
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differences among individuals.39 Another explanation for congressional reluctance to adopt more specific guidelines is the lack
of agreement among educators as to what programs are most effective for certain handicapped children.40 This lack of consensus
indicates some need for flexibility and experimentation at the local
level.
Perhaps the most significant reason Congress failed to prescribe more specific standards is the traditional notion that education is primarily a state and local concern.41 Despite the far-reaching procedural provisions of the present statute, Congress was
apparently unwilling to take the further step of ordering that
specific programs be made available - a process that could lead to
federal allocation of state and local funds. In the end, the hard
choices required to determine the extent of the rights of particular
children were consigned to the discretion of local administrators
and to the judges and hearing officers who review their decisions.
In entrusting local authorities with the responsibility of
creating individualized programs for all their handicapped children - without providing clearer guidelines as to the substance
of such programs - Congress may well have expected too much
of local school administrators. Even assuming good faith on the
part of school officials in dealing with the problems of handicapped
children,42 budgetary constraints will inevitably color many decisions and restrict the range of alternatives offered in the formulation of individualized educational programs. Conscious that
extra dollars spent on special education may be cut from other
portions of the school budget,43 local school administrators may
39
Still, greater particularization in some areas seems desirable. For example,
more explicit testing requirements would be useful. Requiring a basic core of
evaluation procedures in all cases would provide important protections without
great expense. See note 69 infra.
40
See Kirp, Buss & Kuriloff, Legal Reform of Special Education: Empirical
Studies and Procedural Proposals, 62 CAL. L. REV. 40, 47 (r974) ("The response
to almost any interesting question concerning the education of the handicapped
is either that the answer is unknown or that no generalizable beneficial effect of a
given treatment can be demonstrated.").
41
See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, ro4 (r968) ("By and large,
public education in our Nation is committed to the control of state and local
authorities."); I2I CoNG. REc. I9.498 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Dole).
42
Prejudice against the handicapped may sometimes influence the response
of teachers and administrators. See, e.g., Martin, Some Thoughts on Mainstreaming, in CONTEM:PORARY ISSUES IN SPECIAL EDUCATION 230, 231 (1977). Racial prejudices may also be reflected in placement decisions. See, e.g., Lora v. Board of
Educ., 456 F. Supp. I2II, 1263-64 (E.DN.Y. r978); MASSACHUSETTS ADVOCACY
CENTER, DoUPLE JEOPARDY: THE PLIGHT OF MINORITY STUDENTS IN SPECIAL EDUCATION (I978).
43
Funds available from the federal government are not intended to cover the entire cost of educating the handicapped. The amount received by states is determined
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focus on what is available within the school system rather than on
what is most appropriate for an individual child.
Other factors unrelated to a child's needs will also affect the
programs offered by the school system. One such factor may be
the lack of expertise of teachers and administrators. 44 Another
may be the workload of school administrators who must help
formulate and implement individualized education programs.
Often they may cut corners,4 5 or attempt to persuade parents that
their child does not require special programs, simply because they
have no time to deal with the problem.46
Of course, clearer substantive guidelines would not add more
dollars to the budget or more hours to the administrator's day.
But a local official is less likely to ignore a clear statutory mandate - violation of which could threaten the receipt of federal
funds 47 -than to bend flexible rules. Moreover, the threat of a
parental complaint would be more credible where clear regulations made it apparent that the child's rights were being denied.
Ideally, a parental complaint procedure would provide a realistic enforcement mechanism even in the face of ambiguous standards. In practice, however, the voices of many parents may never
be heard. Whether through deference to the experience and
expertise of educators, or because ignorance of handicapping conby multiplying the number of handicapped students identified and served by a fixed
dollar figure- determined each year by calculating a certain percentage of the
average per pupil e."'penditure in the nation. 20 U.S.C. § l4II(a)(1) (1976).
Most of this money is then distributed to localities solely on the basis of the
number of children they serve, with no regard for the nature of the handicaps
involved. Id. § l4II(d) (1976). Localities therefore have an incentive to identify
handicapped children but not to place them in expensive programs. A school
system may receive no more federal money for a child placed in a $20,000 per
year full-time residential program than it does for a child who requires $200 worth
of special reading instruction in the regular public school. A federal funding
scheme responsive to the level of special services a local system provides would
remove some of the financial pressure that now influences placement decisions.
44
The majority of public school teachers in the United States have little or no
training in educating the handicapped. See NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EDUCATION PROFESSIONS DEVELOPMENT, MAINSTREAMING: HELPING TEACHERS MEET
THE CHALLENGE 18 (1976) [hereinafter cited as MAINSTREAMING].
45
The most likely method of cutting corners will be standardization of administrative functions. See Kirp, Buss & Kuriloff, supra note 40, at 47; p. lilI
infra. Such a response is particularly troublesome because of the importance of
individualization in educating the handicapped.
46
See R. WEATHERLEY & M. LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRATS AND INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION 60-62 (1977). The additional paperwork which administrators
must complete as a result of legislative requirements may exacerbate the problem.
Id.
47
See 20 U.S.C. § 1416 (1976).
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ditions renders their expectations of their child too low, 48 many
parents may rely without question on the judgment of teachers
and school officials in making placement decisions.49 As a result,
the discretion of local administrators will often go unchecked.
This problem is particularly acute in the case of poorer and
less educated parents.50 Such parents may defer to the judgment
of school officials because they cannot adequately understand the
complex issues involved in placement decisions, 51 or because they
do not know their rights under the Act.52 Similarly, poor parents
may forego a challenge because they cannot afford the time away
from work or the cost of an attorney. Since class differences
parallel racial differences in many areas, the problem of the passive parent may contribute to the disproportionate assignment of
minority students to less favorable educational placements. 53
Given the importance of the parental complaint mechanism as
a means for enforcing substantive rights, it is necessary to seek
new methods for increasing the effectiveness and accessibility of
that mechanism. Probably the most effective means would be to
make certain that all parents receive sufficient notice of their
children's rights before any action is taken by the school. For
reasons of administrative convenience, schools may formulate
IEP's on a mass production basis and present them to parents as
a fait accompli.54 Uninformed parents may be unaware that
alternative programs exist. Judges and hearing officers can help
deter such abuses by carefully scrutinizing the procedures followed by schools in all cases. They should make certain that
parents are notified before any school action is taken, that the
notice clearly explains the rights of students and the alternative
placements available,55 and that every opportunity is given parents
to take part in the IEP formulation process. Strict adherence to
48
See Krass, supra note 3, at 1018-19 n.18; S. REP. No. 168, 94th CONG., lSt
Sess. 9, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1425, 1430.
49
See R. WEATHERLEY & M. LIPSKY, supra note 46, at 51 & n.87; cf. Debate
Rises on Mandatory School Plans for Handicapped, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1979,
at Aro, col. I (reporting low instance of parental complaints).
50
See Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 1211, 1252-53, 1256 (E.DN.Y.
1978); Sorgen, supra note 38, at 237-38.
51
In some instances the complexity may be created by educators whose specialized jargon awes parents into silent acquiescence. See R. WEATHERLEY & M. LIPSKY, s1tpra note 46, at 53.
52
See Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 12II, 1252-53 (E.DN.Y. 1978).
53
See id. at 1256.
54
See Debate Rises on Mandatory School Plans for Handicapped, supra note
49, at Axe, col. 2.
55
The court in Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. I2II (E.DN.Y. 1978),
suggested that the parties call upon communications experts to develop materials
comprehensible to the poorly educated. Id. at 1295.
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procedural requirements would provide strong evidence of a
school's good faith in attempting to comply with the Act. On the
other hand, a haphazard approach to procedural safeguards should
lead a decisionmaker to view the assertions of school authorities
with suspicion.
To increase the attractiveness of the complaint system to low
and moderate income parents, steps should be taken to reduce the
cost of complaints. States might consider providing attorneys or
advisers 56 to complaining parents free of charge. As an alterna·
tive, Congress might authorize the awarding of attorney's fees to
successful complainants.57 A less expensive option may be to bar
school attorneys from participating in administrative hearings
where the parents are not represented by counsel.58 This may
reduce the adversarial nature of the hear:ing and encourage the
hearing examiner to adopt a more active role as mediator between
the parties. In addition, where a child's evaluation is challenged,
parents should have the right to obtain an independent evaluation
at no expense to themselves.59 The present regulations leave this
right in an unacceptably uncertain status.60
Finally, class actions may provide an effective mechanism for
overcoming the problems of parental inaction under some circum·
stances. Parental advocacy groups might sponsor class actions to
challenge system-wide inadequacies. For example, a charge that
a school system's evaluation procedures were racially biased
56

In administrative hearings, trained nonlawyers may be more effective and
less expensive than attorneys with little experience in this specialized area. The
Act provides parents the right not only to legal counsel, but to anyone "with
special knowledge or training with respect to the problems of handicapped children." 20 U.S.C. § I4I5(d) (I976).
57
The disadvantage of this approach is that money spent for attorneys might
reduce the funds available for educational services. Absent congressional authorization, a court could award attorney's fees only in very limited circumstances. See
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 42I U.S. 240 (I975); IO C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2675, at 32 (Supp.
I979).
58
New York City follows this approach. See Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F.
Supp. I2II, I24I (E.D.N.Y. I978).
59
Such a right may be expensive if parents are given an unconditional right
to choose the specialist to do the evaluation. Massachusetts addressed this problem by providing the right to a free evaluation from any facility approved by
the state. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 7IB, § 3 (West Supp. I979).
60
The regulations provide for an independent evaluation at public expense
1mless the local agency first requests a hearing on the adequacy of the original
evaluation and the hearing officer upholds the appropriateness of that evaluation.
45 C.F.R. § 12Ia.503 {I977). In addition to creating delay by adding another
hearing to the process, this provision only gives protection against evaluations
which fail to conform to the formal requirements of the Act. It would be difficult
for a hearing officer to detect bias or error on the part of the original evaluator
without an independent conclusion against which to compare the original.
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would almost necessarily be brought as a class action. 61 However, the Act makes no specific provision for the bringing of class
actions. It is uncertain under what circumstances a class action
may be brought under the Act. 62

III.

GUIDELINES TO DECISIONMAKING: DETERMINING
THE ScoPE OF SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS UNDER THE AcT

Despite its shortcomings, the parental complaint system is the
primary mechanism for enforcing substantive rights under the
Act. 63 The nature of the educational services received by all
handicapped children will therefore depend to a great extent on
the response of judges and hearing examiners who deal with individual complaints. The Act's broad-brush guidelines, whHe permit.ting a flexible response to individual problems at the local level,
render the task of thes~ decisionmakers exceedingly difficult.
At this early stage in the history of the Act,64 there is little
authority- either scholarly or judicial - which would aid in the
61

See p. n16 infra.
The administrative rulemakers refused to comment on the question. See
42 Fed. Reg. 42,512 (1977). The Act gives courts jurisdiction over actions brought
by any party aggrieved by the decision of a state hearing examiner. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(e)(2) (1976). Courts could interpret this provision to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies by all members of a plaintiff class. Cf. Weinberger v.
Salli, 422 U.S. 749, 763-64 (1975) (court had no jurisdiction to determine claims
of unnamed class members who failed to pursue administrative remedies under
§ 205 (g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1976)). A preferable approach would be to recognize that some of the Act's provisions may go unenforced
unless courts can grant system-wide relief in class actions. See p. 1u6 infra. This
approach would also avoid the unnecessary burden of numerous administrative
complaints on a single issue. Cf. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414
n.8 (1975) (awarding back pay to unnamed plaintiffs who had not fulfilled administrative requirements for bringing suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2oooe to
2oooe-17 (1976)). It seems probable that at least the class representatives must
exhaust the administrative remedies. See id.
In Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 12n ·(E.DN.Y. 1978), the court
ruled on several claims under the Act despite the apparent failure of any plaintiffs
to pursue administrative remedies. Id. at 1291-92. The court avoided the exhaustion issue altogether. Id. at 1216 ("This is essentially a constitutional and not a
statutory case . . . . Defendants' strong reliance on exhaustion cases is, therefore,
inappropriate.").
63
Other mechanisms do exist. Each state has an obligation to withhold federal
funds from local school systems that fail to comply with the Act. 20 U.S.C. § 1414
(b) (2) (1976). While such review may be useful in controlling system-wide
abuses, it seems unlikely that a state could commit sufficient resources to monitor
inadequacies in individual programs.
64
The effective date for the section of the Act establishing procedural safeguards was October l, 1977· Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 8(c) (1975). See Eberle v.
Board of Pub. Educ., 444 F. Supp. 41 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
62
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application of the Act's broad principles to specific cases.00 However, even in the absence of more fully developed case law, it is
possible to predict major areas of potential conflict. An investigation of several areas where complaints seem likely to arise will
illuminate troublesome issues and point the way toward possible
solutions.
A. Complaints Regarding Evaluation
Those portions of the Act which prescribe standards for
evaluation of children provide a few clear guidelines. The Act
proscribes racially or culturally biased evaluation procedures,00
requires that tests be administered in a child's native language, 07
and provides that no single procedure shall be the sole criterion
for determining the placement of a child. 68 Even given these
guidelines, however, decisionmakers face difficult factual inquiries in determining what constitutes an adequate evaluation in
individual cases. Moreover, the clear prohibition of biased evaluation procedures does not eliminate the difficulty of establishing
standards of proof or fashioning remedies in discrimination cases.
1. Inaccurate or Incomplete Evaluations. - Complaints regarding the evaluation of an individual child may take several
forms. For example, some parents may assert that their child's
evaluation was incomplete because the school omitted particular
tests which would provide a clearer picture of the child's needs.
Beyond the prohibition of reliance on a single criterion for placement, neither the statute nor the regulations attempt to define
how many or what types of tests must form the basis of a placement decision. 69 The regulations call for assessment "in all areas
related to the suspected disability." 70 Several considerations suggest that decisionmakers should construe this requirement broadly.
The suspected disability may be only distantly related to the
actual disability, and only a broad range of tests could uncover
65
Several articles discuss the Act's substantive provisions. See, e.g., Krass,
supra note 3, at 1063-77; Levinson, supra note 61 at 276-81; Note, supra note

8, at 135-s2.
66
20 u.s.c. § 1412(5)(C) (1976).
67
Id. Students with hearing or speech difficulties axe to be given tests in their
own "mode of communication,'' id., to ensure that test results which purport
to measure aptitude do not actually reflect an inability to communicate. See 45
C.F.R. § 121a.532(c) (1977).
68
20 U.S.C. § 1412 (5)(C) (1976).
69 A statutory requirement that certain basic assessments be made in every
case, coupled with more specialized inquiries into the area of suspected disability,
seems preferable to the general language of the present provisions. Cf. MAss. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 71B, § 3 (West Supp. 1979) (requiring evaluations at least by a
teacher, a physician, a psychologist, and a nurse or social worker).
70
45 C.F.R. § 121a.532 (f) (1977).
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the real problem. A child with multiple handicaps might be
classified only under the most obvious one. Since the consequences
of misclassification far outweigh the cost of more extensive evaluation,71 decisionmakers should be extremely liberal in ordering
additional tests when requested.
In other instances parents may complain not that an evaluation rests on incomplete testing procedures, but that the outcome of an evaluation is simply inaccurate.72 When such complaints arise, hearing officers and judges may confront the task of
choosing between highly technica:l arguments presented by experts
from both sides. Despite the difficulty of such inquiries, disagreement among experts provides no justification for avoiding hard
questions altogether. 73 Courts undertake equally complex inquiries in many other areas. 74 Moreover, where the evaluation of
an individual child is at issue, there is little reason to fear that
hard choices will result in system-wide adherence to potentially
unsound policies and stifle local creativity. Given the unlimited
variety of handicapping conditions, it seems unlikely that a
factual determination regarding the accuracy of an individual
evaluation could have far-reaching precedential impact.
2. Racially or Culturally Biased Evaluation Procedures: The
Testing Quagmire. - In the past, much of the controversy over
evaluation has centered around the use of racially and culturally
biased testing procedures.75 Although such procedures apparently
continue to receive widespread use, 76 challenges to biased testing
may seldom arise through individual complaints. Parents will often
be reluctant to challenge the apparently "scientific" results of a
71

See Sorgen, supra note 38, at 218-19.
It might be argued in response that decisionmakers are empowered to do
no more than ascertain whether the Act's explicit requirements are fulfilled. Under
such an interpretation, any nondiscriminatory process which incorporated two
or more placement criteria - no matter how unreliable - would be beyond challenge. If the protections of the Act are so limited, then it is not clear why Congress provided the right to an independent evaluation, see 20 U.S.C. § l415(b)(1)
(A) (1976). Moreover, to ignore potential inaccuracies is to overlook a fundamental purpose of due process safeguards - to guard against erroneous judgments.
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976).
73
While technical complexity and disagreement among experts may justify
judicial deference to the views of a qualified administrative hearing examiner, see
Bazelon, supra note 36, at 744, they cannot justify a policy under which a hearing
officer defers to the position of a party in interest, such as the school.
74
See Bazelon, supra note 36, at 744.
75
See, e.g., Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd, 502
F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1974); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 478-92 (D.D.C.
1967), aff'd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
76
See Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 1211, 1243, 1285-86 (E.D.N.Y.
1978).
72
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standardized test. 77 More significantly, a charge that a particular
procedure is discriminatory would be difficult to establish without
reference to the impact of the procedure beyond the case of an
individual child. Individual parents will seldom possess the
energy, knowledge, or financial resources necessary to undertake
a system-wide investigation. Thus, the Act's procedural system designed to resolve complaints concerning individual children provides a poorly suited mechanism for attacking problems that
affect an entire local system or perhaps an entire state.78 Earlier
challenges to discriminatory testing have come through class
actions. 79 Only to the extent that courts are willing to entertain
such class actions under the Act 80 will the antidiscrimination
provision provide an effective weapon for advocates.81
Lf such challenges arise, they will probably rely on statistical
proof of racially disproportionate impact to establish a charge of
discrimination.82 Courts must then determine what effect is to be
given to such a showing. With respect to the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court held in Washington v. Davis 83 that,
absent proof of discriminatory intent on the part of a defendant,
disproportionate impact will be insufficient to establish a violation
of equal protection.84 The Court distinguished cases under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.85 Five years earlier, in Griggs
77
See Sorgen, supra note 38, at 231; cf. R. WEATHERLEY & M. LIPSKY, s11pra
note 46, at 53 ("technical jargon lends an aura of science to the [IEP conference]
while making much of the discussion unintelligible to the parent").
78 For this reason, other mechanisms of enforcement may be especially important. If states are to fulfill their statutory obligation to eliminate discrimination in evaluation procedures, see 20 U.S.C. § l412(5)(C) '(1976), then state agencies must closely monitor the racial composition of various educational placements
at the local level and investigate instances of disproportionate assignment by race.
Cf. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 71B, § 6 (West Supp. 1979) •(requiring state Department of Education to make such investigations).
79 See, e.g., Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. l2II (E.D.N.Y. 1978);
Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972), afj'd, 502 F.2d 963 (9th
Cir. 1974).
so See note 62 supra.
81 Of course, other grounds are available for attacking biased testing.
Cases
have relied on equal protection, see, e.g., Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D.
Cal. 1972), aff'd, 502 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1974); Hobson ·v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp.
401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir.
1969), and on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 20ood to
20ood-4 (1976), see Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. l2Il, 1277-78, 1292
(E.D.N.Y. 1978). Title VI may provide a preferred basis since it would not require a showing of discriminatory intent on the part of the school district, see
id. at 1277.
82
See Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. l2II (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
83
426 U.S. 229 (1976).
84
Id. at 238-39.
85 Id. at 246-48. Title VII is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2oooe to 2oooe-17 (1976).
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v. Duke Power Co., 86 the Court had ruled that disproportionate
impact alone is enough to establish a prima fade case of illegal
discrimination under Title VII.87 In Griggs, the Court noted that
the purpose of Title VII was to "achieve equality of employment
opportunities," 88 and to remove "artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers" to employment of minorities.89 An inquiry
into the purposes of the Handicapped Act suggests that the
Griggs standard should apply to the Act's antidiscrimination provision. Litigation prior to the Act revealed that discriminatory
testing procedures created a barrier to equal educational opportunity for minorities.90 Since one aim of the Act was to remedy
that inequity, and since the Act's language is phrased in terms of
effect rather than motivation,91 racially disproportionate impact
should suffice to establish a prima fade case of discriminatory
·evaluation under the Act.
Once such a prima fade violation has been established, the
burden of proof shifts to the school to justify its procedures.92 Unlike tests in the employment context,93 however, educational evaluation procedures cannot be defended by proving that they are
valid predictors of future performance.94 Courts have recognized
that educational testing results may be nothing more than selffulfilling prophecies.95 Biased tests may be accurate predictors of
educational progress simply because test results shape the expectations of both teachers and students.96 Schools could justify the
continued use of challenged procedures only by proof that racially
disproportionate placements resulted from environmental factors
beyond the control of the school. 97
86

401 U.S. 424 (1971).
Id. at 430-31.
88
Id, at 429,
89
Id. at 431.
90
See H-0bson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), afj'd sub nom.
Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
91
See 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (5) (C) (1976) (evaluation procedures must be selected
and administered "so as not ta be •.. discriminatory" (emphasis added)).
92
See Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 12u, 1277 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
93
See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
94
Sorgen, supra note 38, at 231-32.
95
See Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 491 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nom.
Smuck v. Hobson, 4o8 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (noting "the likelihood that the
student will act out [the testing] judgment and confirm it by achieving only at
the expected level" (footnote omitted)) ; Sorgen, supra note 38, at 219 (manner in
which a school treats different children a more significant determinant of pupil
performance than the initial bases for classification).
96
Rosenthal & Jacobson, Teacher Expectation for the Disadvantaged, SCIENTIFIC .AMERICAN, April 1968, at 19; Sorgen, supra note 38, at 219.
97 For example, a school may show that children raised in a ghetto environment
87
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Even after a plaintiff prevails in a challenge to testing procedures, the most difficult problem of all may still remain. The
science of educational testing is not so finely developed that clear
remedies will ·be readily available in all cases. 08 Where courts or
hearing officers order an end to discriminatory procedures, school
systems may be hard-pressed to produce a nondiscriminatory substitute. Biased standardized tests may be replaced by an uncertain set of highly subjective <:riteria which leave broad discretion in the hands of individual educators. Under such circumstances, personal biases - either conscious or unconscious - can
produce a different form of discrimination.00 Because of the
absence of clear solutions, the evaluation area calls for particular
caution in the formulation of remedies. Courts may find themselves relying heavily on the efforts of the parties to arrive at
acceptable solutions.100 Often, the proper function of the judge or
hearing officer may be to serve as a catalyst for cooperation
between the parties and to ensure that schools endeavor in good
faith to devise practical alternatives to discriminatory procedures.
B. Placement Decisions: The "Mainstreaming" Controversy
Conflicts over the actual services necessary to constitute an
"appropriate" educational program will present perhaps the
most difficult issues arising under the Act. Such conflicts give rise .
to two types of questions. First, what is the proper environment
in which to educate a handicapped child? And second, what particular services must be delivered to that child? This Section
will deal with the former question. The more general question of
determining the "appropriate" level of services will be addressed
in the final Section.
The Handicapped Act's endorsement of the concept of "mainstreaming" 101 is perhaps its most controversial feature. 102 The
are more likely to suffer emotional disturbances than other children. See Lora v.
Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 12u, 1256-63 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
98
See id. at 1247 ("[I]t is too early to expect professional agreement on standardization in the [classification] field. . . . Courts are not in a position to lead
the most advanced of the educators, clinicians and theoreticians in enforcing nonexistent standards.").
99
See id. at 1245. Even where tests themselves are nondiscriminatory, personal
biases may have an impact on the process of referring children for initial evaluation. See id. at 1263-64.
100
See id. at 1294.
101
Commentators have objected to the use of the term "mainstreaming" in
describing the Act, claiming it denotes indiscriminate placement of all handicapped
children in regular classrooms. See Stafford, supra note 15, at 76. The term is
used throughout this Section to mean a general policy favoring regular class
placement of handicapped children in appropriate circumstances.
102
See, e.g., Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 12n, 1268 (E.D.N.Y.
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only guideline Congress provided for determining what constitutes
an appropriate placement is the admonition that handicapped
children should be educated together with the nonhandicapped
"to the maximum extent appropriate." 103 Special classes or segregated environments are limited to cases in which "the nature or
severity of the handicap is such that education in regular classes
with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved
satisfactorily." 104 Thus, the statute appears to place the burden
of persuasion on any party - either parent or school - seeking
to remove the child from the regular educational environment.
However, the Act provides little guidance for determining at what
point education in the regular classroom becomes unsatisfactory.
A discussion of the history of the mainstreaming concept in both
the legal and the educational contexts may serve to illuminate
.both the policies supporting the concept and the problems inherent in its application. An understanding of this background
suggests several factors decisionmakers might consider in determining when placement in the regular classroom is appropriate.
In the sixties and early seventies, a number of educators began
a movement toward increased integration of handicapped students
into regular classrooms. 105 These educators questioned the effectiveness of the traditional practice of educating the handicapped especially the mildly mentally retarded - in separate schools or
separate classes.106 More significantly, they argued that by labeling a child "handicapped" or "retarded" and removing that child
from the regular classroom, a school places a stigma upon that
child that far outweighs the dubious benefits of separate classes.107
In addition, noting that special clru?S placement often meant
permanent assignment to an environment in which minimal skills
were taught and minimal accomplishment was expected, some
educators looked to mainstreaming as a solution to the problem
1978); MAINSTREAMING, supra note 44, at 1-2; Greenberg & Doolittle, Can Schools
Speak the Language of the Deaf?, N.Y. Times, Dec. II, 1977, § 6 (Magazine), at
50-52; Schools Are Forced to Pay More Attention to Disabled, N.Y. Times, May
II, 1977, at A2o, col. 2.
103
20 U.S.C. § 1412 (5) (B) (1976) ·
104 Id.
105
See, e.g., Dunn, Special Ed11Cation for the Mildly Retarded- Is Much of
It Justifiable?, 35 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 5 (1968) ; Reynolds, A Framework for
Considering Some Issues in Special Education, 28 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 367
(1962).
106
Actually, the "traditional" practice of educating handicapped children in
special classes began only in this century. See Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded
Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 294 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Johnson,
Special Education for the Mentally Handicapped-Paradox, 29 EXCEPTIONAL
CHILDREN 62, 62-66 (1962). Prior to this time, many handicapped children were
simply excluded from scltool altogether. Dunn, supra note 105, at 5.
107
See, e.g., Dunn, supra note 105, at 9.
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of misclassification.108 Finally, some objected that special classes
had become a tool for maintaining racial segregation.100
None of these early proponents argued that regular classroom
placement was right for all handicapped children all of the time.
Instead, they urged schools to provide a flexible system for dealing with children with widely divergent needs. Such a system
would include a continuum of alternative placements from the
"least restrictive" - the regular classroom - to the "most restrictive" - full-time residence in an institutionY 0 A handicapped child would be placed in the least restrictive educational
setting in which she could successfully function.
The concept of mainstreaming gained legal significance following the consent decree in Pensylvania Association for Retarded
Children [PARC] v. Pennsylvania,m a case that had widespread
influence on later developments. The court order in PARC included the requirement that "among the alternative programs of
education . . . available, placement in a regular public school
class is preferable . . . to placement in any other type of program." 112 Echoing the arguments of many educators that
placement of retarded children in separate classes gives rise to
social stigma, 113 plaintiffs in PARC contended that due process
requires certain procedural safeguards before a state may classify
an individual in a manner that is stigmatizing.114 Under this
theory, a handicapped child would be presumed to be correctly
placed in a normal classroom. If the school desired to move the
child into a separated environment, it could do so only after
providing a hearing for the child's parents.rn Although the
Supreme Court's more recent decision in Paul v. Davis 116 has
cast doubt on the stigma rationale as a trigger to due process safeguards,117 the argument was widely accepted at the time of PARC
108
See Paul, Mainstreaming Emotionally Disturbed Children, in MAINSTREAMING EMOTIONALLY DISTURBED CHILDREN 1, 8 (1977).
109
See Dunn, supra note 105.
110 See Abeson, EdttCation for Handicapped Children in the Least Restrictive
Environment, in THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW 514, 516-20
(M. Kindred ed. 1976) ; Reynolds, supra note 105.
111
334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), modified, 343 F. Supp. 279 (1972).
A similar doctrine emerged in cases requiring treatment for civilly committed mental patients in the least restrictive environment. See Chambers, The Principle of
the Least Restrictive Alternative: The Constitutional Issues, in THE MENTALLY
RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW 486 (M. Kindred ed. 1976).
112
334 F. Supp. at 1260.
113
See pp. n1g-20 supra.
114
See 343 F. Supp. at 295.

115 Jd.
116

424 U.S. 693 (1976).

117

In finding that the plaintiffs had a "colorable" due process claim, the
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and was codified in the procedural requirements of the Act.118
The chief concern motivating the court and plaintiffs in
PARC, 119 as well as the educators who began the mainstreaming
movement,1 20 was the widespread practice of "dumping" - placing
handicapped children into inadequate special classes 121 in order
to rid teachers and school officials of the problem of dealing with
the children's special needs. It was against the background of
such concerns that Congress passed the Act.
More recently, the mainstreaming doctrine has encountered
criticism from a number of sources. Critics have asserted that
mainstreaming handicapped children without major changes in
the size and structure of regular classes places impossible demands
upon the teacher and may lead to neglect of the needs of all students.122 Some specialists have voiced the fear that emphasis on
mainstreaming is diverting necessary funds from the types of
special programs that may be most helpful to many handicapped
students.123 Others have argued that the isolation resulting from
being "different" in a class where others are perceived as "normal"
can be more damaging than the stigma of separation.124 To the
extent that these fears materialize in actual practice, many complaints under the Act may not assert that children are being excluded from the classroom, but that they are being improperly
"dumped" into regular classrooms when at least some separate
services might be more worthwhile.125
PARC court relied on Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971), a case

holding that a state must provide notice and a hearing before publicly posting and stigmatizing- the names of alleged drunkards, id. at 436. Pennsylvania Ass'n
for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 295 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
The constitutional validity of the Constantineau holding has been cast in serious
doubt by Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701--<>2 (1976) (:finding no violation of due
process when police labeled plaintiff an "active shoplifter" without notice or hearing).
118
See 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1976).
119
See 343 F. Supp. at 294.
120
See Dunn, supra note 105, at 20.
121
For a description of such a class, see Hairston v. Drosick, 423 F. Supp. 180
(S.D. W. Va. 1976).
122
See, e.g., Greenberg & Doolittle, supra note 102, at 50; Milofsky, Schooling
tlte Kids No One Wants, N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1977, § 6 (Magazine), at 25, 28. A
major problem is that most classroom teachers are inadequately prepared to deal
with special-needs children. See MAINSTREAMING, supra note 44, at 18-19.
123
See Greenberg & Doolittle, supra note 102 1 at 102.
124
See id. at 82.
125
One state official noted that the vast majority of parental complaints seek
additional services for their children while only a few seek regular class placement. Interview with Stephen Bardige, Assistant Director, Bureau of Special
Education Appeals, Massachusetts Department of Education, in Boston (January
3, 1979).
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Judges and hearing officers face a difficult task in attempting
to reconcile the Act's maximum integration requirement with the
concerns reflected in such complaints. Still, the Act clearly expresses the congressional policy that integration is to be the governing principle in placement decisions. 126 Perhaps the best approach for decisionmakers in this area is to apply the maximum
integration provision as a rebuttable presumption that every child
is properly placed in the regular classroom. Then, keeping in mind
the concerns which motivated the mainstreaming movement as
well as the potential problems which can arise from regular classroom placement, decisionmakers must weigh the various factors
which could render such placement unsatisfactory. 127 The following discussion attempts to illuminate several such factors.
First, placement in a regular classroom in some cases may be
unsatisfactory because an alternative placement offers a promise
of significantly greater academic benefit. This factor must be
cautiously weighed. The legislative policy in favor of integration
should not give way to baseless fears of academic disaster. The
party wishing to place a child outside the regular classroom
must present clear objective evidence indicating why such a placement should be favored. Also, a decisionmaker should keep in
mind that the maximum integration provision requires more than a
mere comparing of academic benefits. Regular classroom placement does not become unsatisfactory simply because it is not, from
an academic standpoint, the best placement available. Decisionmakers must weigh any potential academic benefit of special class
placement against the possible social or psychological detriment
that may result from the separation of a child from her nonhandicapped peers. 128 A showing that placement outside the regular
classroom promises only a marginal advantage in academic terms
should be insufficient to overcome the maximum integration presumption. Finally, decisionmakers should keep in mind that
regular class placement need not be an all-or-nothing proposition.
Full-time special class placement should never be ordered where
part-time removal from the regular class would suffice.
Frequent major disruptions of a class by a handicapped student might also render regular class placement unsatisfactory.120
Once again, the party seeking removal from the normal environment should have the burden of proof. In particular, a decisionmaker should not infer a likelihood of disruptive behavior from
126

See
See
128
See
129
See
127

Stafford, supra note 15, at 76.
20 U.S.C. § 1412 (5) (B) (1976).
p. nx9 supra.
45 C.F.R. § 121a.552 ·(1977) (comment).
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the nature of a child's handicap alone. 130 A clear history of past
misconduct should be required. Of course, decisionmakers must
be careful to distinguish cases of disruptive behavior by a handicapped child from instances of disruption resulting from the reactions of other children to the presence of a handicapped student.131
Where a history of misconduct is established, the inquiry may
become even more complex. Past disruptiveness may have resulted
in part from inappropriate educational services. Therefore, a decisionmaker should be reluctant to order removal from the regular
class where a school has made no previous effort to accommodate
the special needs of a child within the regular classroom. Still,
placement of a previously disruptive child in the regular classroom
over the protest of school authorities may often mean returning
the child to a hostile environment. While such hostility provides
no basis for discounting the rights of the child,132 it cannot realistically be ignored. Decisionmakers must search for measures to
reduce possible hostility and assure that regular class placement
is given a fair chance to succeed.133
A final factor that must be considered in determining the
appropriateness of regular class placement is the education of the
nonhandicapped child. By increasing the demands on the classroom teacher, the presence of a handicapped child might diminish
the quality of the education offered to all students in the class.
Much of the recent criticism of mainstreaming has focused on
this problem.134 To the extent that mainstreaming is implemented
without proper adjustments in the educational environment,
integration may be a disaster not only for the handicapped student, but for her nonhandicapped peers as well. At the same time,
the rights of handicapped children should not be sacrificed in
130
Predictions of future disruptive behavior are sometimes unreliable and
should be subjected to careful scrutiny. See Dershowitz, Preventive Confinement:
A Suggested Framework for Constitutional Analysis, 51 TEX. L. REv. 1277, 130507 (1973).
131
Nonhandicapped children may react out of prejudice or discomfort at the
presence of a handicapped child. The rights of handicapped children should not
be circumvented by reference .to such prejudices. Cf. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S.
1, 7 (1958) (hostility toward integration not a factor for consideration by district
court in determining relief); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 425 F. Supp. 987,
1023 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (likelihood of hostile reaction by neighbors no justification
for refusing relief under Title VIII of Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 36013619 (1976)), modified, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908
(1978).
132
See note 131 supra.
133 Such measures might include ordering frequent parent-teacher conferences
or requiring assignment of the student to a teacher who had not witnessed the
previous disruptive behavior.
134
See p. u21 & note 122 supra.
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every case of potential conflict with those of more advantaged
children.
Since the Act precludes determination of the appropriateness
of regular class placement without simultaneous consideration of
supplementary aids and services that could render such placement appropriate,1 35 close observance of the requirements of the
Act should minimize this conflict in most cases. Ideally, provision
of proper support services would greatly reduce the special burdens on classroom teachers resulting from mainstreaming of a
handicapped child.136 Of course, schools are likely to plead that
fiscal constraints prohibit the reductions in class size or the hiring
of additional personnel necessary to bring about this result. But
courts have turned a deaf ear to such pleas in the past. 137 To the
extent that necessary funds may have to be diverted from other
educational programs, the education of nonhand:icapped children
may be affected. Nevertheless, this result is at least more equitable than placing the full burden of fiscal limitations on the
educational rights of the handicapped child.138
135
See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5) (B) (1976). Necessary supplementary aids and
services would vary depending on the child. A learning disabled student might
require the assistance of a special teacher who visits the normal classroom for
a short period each day. A deaf student might require a full-time interpreter.
136
The Act does not indicate to what extent-if any- a court may order
changes in the regular classroom itself. In some cases, a reduction in class size
may be preferable to - and less stigmatizing than - additional support services
within the classroom. Though the Act's mainstreaming provision speaks of "s11pplementary aids and services," 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (5)(B) (1976) (emphasis added),
the power of a decisionmaker to grant appropriate relief would appear to embrace changes in the educational environment as well. Still, many decisionmakers
may be reluctant to intrude so directly into local practices. In some districts,
decisionmakers will not face this problem since teacher contracts require class
size reductions where handicapped children are mainstreamed. See R. WEATHERLEY
& M. LIPSKY, supra note 46, at 31 & n.69.
137
See Davis v. Southeastern Community College, 574 F.2d u58, u62 (4th
Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 830 (1979) (Section 504 of Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976), requires even "expensive" special services); Hairston v. Drosick, 423 F. Supp. l8o, 184 (S.D. W. Va. 1976); cf. Barnes v. Converse
College, 436 F. Supp. 635, 637-39 (D.S.C. 1977) (noting that the possible financial
consequence of future demands by other handicapped students is not a valid consideration for the court).
Advocates have responded to the inadequate funds defense by pointing out
that it may be more costly not to educate the handicapped, since failure to train
children for a self-sufficient life may lead them to rely on public assistance. See
S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1425, 1433·
138
Cf. Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 876 (D.D.C. 1972) ("The
inadequacies of the [school system] cannot be permitted to bear more heavily
on the ... handicapped child than on the normal child.").
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C. Program Decisions: Defining "Appropriate" Education
At the center of many complaints will be a conflict over the
nature and quality of services to which a handicapped child is
entitled. Parents will assert that the law requires certain services
to be provided. The school representatives - aware of the constraints of their own budget 139 - will contend that "appropriate"
means something less. 140
The language of the Act provides no clear guidelines for resolving such a conflict.141 Judges and hearing officers must develop standards for evaluating the facts of individual cases. It
seems possible to suggest a few general propositions that might
lend direction to their inquiry. To begin with, it seems clear that
"appropriate" cannot mean the best possible education that a
school could provide if given access to unlimited funds. At the
same time, it undoubtedly means more than simply opening the
doors of the regular classroom to those capable of entering and
learning without special assistance. The Act surely contemplates
a standard of appropriateness somewhere between these two extremes.
Beyond this almost self-evident conclusion, it is difficult to
formulate an abstract standard of appropriateness that provides a
convenient measuring rod against which to compare the needs of
widely divergent individuals. A helpful standard must be one
which recognizes individual learning capacity and determines the
extent to which that capacity will be developed. An ideal system
would be designed to achieve the maximum development of the
intellectual capacity of every child. A more practicable standard
might be one which de.fined appropriateness in relation to the
actual level of educational services provided for most children
within a given school system.142 Under such a standard, an appropriate education for a particular child would require services
aimed at developing the child's intellectual capacity to the same
139

See note 43 supra.
In some instances, school officials may oppose a parental complaint for
political reasons, finding it easier to demand additional funds from local government when they can show that a court has ordered the expenditure.
141
See 20 U.S.C. § I40I(I8) (I976).
142
Of course, such a standard permits inequities between children in different
systems. One could argue that "appropriate" must have a fixed meaning for all
systems. But, given the tradition of local funding of education, and the reluctance
of courts to interfere with that system, see San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 4u U.S. I '(I973), it seems unlikely that passage of the Act will create
uniformity for the handicapped where none exists for other children. Decisionmaker.i will be more likely to bend their notions of appropriateness according
to local conditions. Cf. 80 HARv. L. REv. 898, 902 (I967) (judges likely to be influenced in determination of what is possible by present level of facilities).
140
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degree that the school sought to develop the "normal" abilities
of its nonhandicapped students.143
Thus, an appropriate education for a physically handicapped
child with a normal intellectual capacity would be a program designed to promote academic achievement roughly equivalent to
that of her nonhandicapped peers. 144 This standard might require
only that the school make classrooms accessible to the student and
provide for medical needs that might interfere with classroom
performance. 145 An appropriate education for a blind child with
normal intelligence would require sufficient auditory or braille
instruction to permit academic performance commensurate with
normal achievement of nonhandicapped children.
A similar - though perhaps more difficult - comparison
might be made in cases of children whose handicaps impair their
intellectual capacity. For example, a school system that provides
the best in modern facilities and a low student-teacher ratio for
its nonhandicapped children could justify neither a failure to provide the best available support services to a mildly retarded child
nor a high student-teacher ratio in special programs for the
severely retarded. Conversely, a poor school district which educated all of its children in overcrowded classrooms with limited
facilities might not be required to offer the most scientifically
advanced programs to .its handicapped students.146 In all circumstances, this concept of appropriateness would at least require an
equitable sharing of educational resources. Of course, equality
would mean more than equal spending for all students; 147 it
Cf. 45 C.F.R. § 84.33(b)(1) (1977) (Section 504 of Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976), requires education which meets the needs of the
handicapped as adequately as the needs of the nonhandicapped are met).
144
An appropriate physical education program for such a child might be
determined through a rough comparison to the level of facilities made available
to nonhandicapped students.
145
Cf. Hairston v. Drosick, 423 F. Supp. l8o (S.D. W. Va. 1976) (Section 504
of Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976), requires school to provide
assistance necessary to permit child with spina bifida to remain in regular classroom).
146
Of course, the notion of appropriateness, like equal protection, may include a requirement of some minimal level of education in all cases. Cf. San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 4n U.S. 1 1 37 (1973) (noting possibility of equal protection violation where school fails to provide the opportunity "to
acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech
and of full participation in the political process").
147
The Act requires more than equal spending. The funds received under
the Act are to be used to meet "excess costs." 20 U.S.C. § l4r4(a) (I) (1976).
"Excess costs" are costs over and above the school's average annual per pupil expenditures. Id. at § 1401(20) (1976); cf. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974)
(school must do more than provide equal services where non-English-speaking
students received no meaningful education without special instruction).
143

1979]

APPROPRIATE EDUCATION

II27

would require equal opportunity for individual development.
In the end, judges and hearing officers must look to a wide
variety of sources for their conclusions. They may rely on a consensus of expert opinion where any exists. They may look to
practices in similar districts or neighboring states. In future
years they may look to previous decisions of courts and hearing
officers as precedents. The development of a "common law" for
decisionmaking under the Act would eliminate much of the
ambiguity of the current standards. There is, however, the danger
that it may rigidify those standards and stifle the potential for
creative response under the Act. Hearing officers should be careful to regard earlier decisions only as general guidelines for
principled decisionmaking and not as mandates that a particular
program is the appropriate placement for any child with a particular type of handicap.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The Education for All Handicapped Children Act has set the
stage for judges and hearing officers to take an active role in the
intimate details of educational decisionmaking while seeking to
safeguard the rights of the handicapped. The success of that
venture will depend in large part on the ability of these decisionmakers to fashion standards for individual cases in the absence
of clear statutory guidelines. Until more precise regulations or
judicial interpretations add new substance to those guidelines,
their task will be exceedingly difficult. At the same time, unless
special steps are taken to increase the accessibility of the complaint system for all parents, the promise of the Act may be an
empty one for many children.
Still, in the past courts have risen to the challenge of turning
vague language into meaningful guidelines for conduct,148 and
judges have been particularly scrupulous in assuring that procedural safeguards provide real protection rather than meaningless
formality. 149 In entrusting courts with the ultimate power to review the appropriateness of individual programs, Congress has
placed great faith in such judicial virtues. Only further experience
with judicial enforcement of the statute will indicate whether that
faith was well-placed.
148
See Friendly, In Praise of Erie -And of the New Federal Common Law,
39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 405-22 (1964).
149
E.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).

